I am surprised you would say in response to Rohini’s comment that

You have forgotten to mention that the differnce between India and Sri lanka is that it is state sponsored against its own citizens in Sri lanka but that is not the case in India.

Surely the long history of communal “riots” in this country tells us that no riot can ever actually occur without the complicity of the state in every instance, and outright state sponsored genocide in some. The Anti-Sikh “riots” of 1984 and the Gujarat pogrom against Muslims in 2002 are horrifying reminders of how deeply enmeshed the state is in violence against communities. The Modi government not only prevented the police and bureaucracy from doing its job in protecting Muslim citizens, but actively assisted the mobs as they raped, pillaged and murdered over 4,500 people over a period of three days.

The current violence in Orissa against Christians speaks of an ineffectual government, but let us also remember that the ruling BJD is an ally of the BJP which is a fascist right-wing party whose own lumpen support base is responsible for the continuing attacks against Christians.

Therefore I think there is no reason at all for us to be sanguine about the role of the state in violence against its own citizens in India.

You say that

“What we do have in Sri Lanka is discrimination against minority communities, and persecution and violence directed at them for much of the period since Independence. I would see this as a failure of democracy, the bedrock of which is equality, rather than a ‘national question’. At present, there are parts of India where Muslim and Christian minority communities are being subjected to persecution that is worse than the treatment of Tamils by the state in Sri Lanka, but no one talks of a ‘national question’ in India. The Nazis exterminated the Jewish and Roma minority communities in Germany, but this, too, is not referred to as a ‘national question’. I feel that reference to a ‘national question’ in Sri Lanka is a concession to Sinhala and Tamil nationalism, whereas posing the issue as a failure of democracy facilitates a critique of both.”

You have forgotten to mention that the differnce between India and Sri lanka is that it is state sponsored against its own citizens in Sri lanka but that is not the case in India.

You both raise interesting questions. I don’t think I am in disagreement with Rohini’s concern, but I think there are both a semantic question and a political question. And of course, the two are related.

The semantic question is how we understand the ‘national question’ in Sri Lanka, whether it is about the Tamil and Sinhala nationalism, and the ‘nation’ in the sense of the debates about the formation of a new ‘nation state’ or whether it is a question about Sri Lanka as a ‘nation’ in the pedestrian sense of the term. I would argue that the way we talk about the ‘national question’ now in Sri Lanka, it is not so much about the right to self-determination as the ‘national question’, the way it was originally formulated in the debates between Luxemburg and Lenin, which Rohini referred to in a very welcome critique of nationalism in lines magazine, in February 2003 in an article titled ‘Nationalism and the Left in Sri Lanka’. That after the Left becoming very weak in Sri Lanka, in the mainstream the ‘national question’ has come to mean a political problem about minorities. However, the Sinhala nationalists now want to claim the ‘national question’ as a political problem does not exist, and that the only problem is one of a military problem to be addressed through the eradication of “terrorism”.

That is the political problem for me, do we drop the use of the concept ‘national question’ particularly at this moment, when there is a systematic attack from the Right, and a refusal to recognize the problem of minorities as a political problem? How even democratization etc are co-opted by the current Regime to deflect attention away from this political problem? This is something that Thushara and I tried to articulate in a recent article in the June issue of Himal in an article titled, ‘Critical Thinking in Wartime’. I feel there is quite a bit of traction around the use of the term ‘national question’ in the devolution debate in Sri Lanka and we need to think carefully about how we shift this debate away from its nationalist moorings but at the same time not throw out the baby with bath water so to speak, by losing the democratic potential inherent in the use of the concept ‘national question’ to signify a political problem.

And this of course brings me to the question of democracy. Indeed any discussion of the national question has to engage with the problem of democracy, as both Rohini and Aditya have mentioned. Furthermore, majoritarian democracy has been a root cause for the conflict in Sri Lanka. I would like to point to Rohini’s excellent article in the EPW of 9 August 2008, titled, ‘Democracy as a Solution to Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis’, where she has articulated the importance of any move towards devolution being underpinned by democracy. However, this idea of democracy I feel should not be reduced to rights (whether of human rights or minority rights) or for that matter of discrimination, but should entail fundamental restructuring of the State. The weight given to such restructuring of the State in the debates around the ‘national question’ is another reason why I am reluctant to throw out the use of the concept ‘national question’, even if the meaning in Sri Lanka has shifted considerably from its original formulation in the Marxist debates. For me the question about the ‘national question’ as consisting of both a semantic question and a political question remains open, and I feel it has more to do with political engagement at the current moment than a question of purely a theoretical or historical nature.

And to Aditya’s question about the logic of democracy, and its tendencies to lean towards the logic of numbers and the majoritarian tendency, is there not room to change that through struggle and work towards reforming institutions? One line of thinking in the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum which I belong to, is to think in terms of coalitions of minorities, not just on the basis of ethnic minorities (and yes the historical problem of the ‘national question’), but to broaden it to broader coalitions of overlapping minorities of caste, ethnic, gender, economically marginalized etc. That would lead political equations, not limited to that of national majorities and minorities or ethnic majorities and minorities, but rather different alliances in the realm of democratic struggle.

While I agree with much of Ahilan’s article, I would take issue with his reference to the ‘national question’ in Sri Lanka. Historically, the ‘national question’ has been seen to arise when there is a struggle to constitute a nation-state. For those who accept the legitimacy of the Tamil nationalist struggle for an exclusively Tamil state in the North-East of Sri Lanka, there might indeed be a ‘national question’, but for those who reject this goal, and for the rest of Sri Lanka, there is no ‘national question’ at present: Sri Lanka gained its independence over sixty years ago.

What we do have in Sri Lanka is discrimination against minority communities, and persecution and violence directed at them for much of the period since Independence. I would see this as a failure of democracy, the bedrock of which is equality, rather than a ‘national question’. At present, there are parts of India where Muslim and Christian minority communities are being subjected to persecution that is worse than the treatment of Tamils by the state in Sri Lanka, but no one talks of a ‘national question’ in India. The Nazis exterminated the Jewish and Roma minority communities in Germany, but this, too, is not referred to as a ‘national question’. I feel that reference to a ‘national question’ in Sri Lanka is a concession to Sinhala and Tamil nationalism, whereas posing the issue as a failure of democracy facilitates a critique of both.

I do have a sketchy historical knowledge about the Sri Lankan context, and surely glossed over them as I found Kadirgamar’s line of argument too diverse, vague and policy-ridden to be convincing.

Kadirgamar talks about groups but doesn’t go into the question of hierarchy ‘among’ groups (except in terms of the general “middle class male radicalism” within all groups and the specific problem of the LTTE). I was also uncomfortable with Kadirgamar’s fuzzy blend of concerns – from “generational” differences, to “limitations of middle class politics of dissent”, to “middle class progressive politics”, to “middle-class male radicalism”, to “totalitarian militarism”, and to a recall of Althusser’s ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’.

I understand everything he means to say but find it more confusing than illuminating. But in all this confusion – one thing seems pretty clear – Kadirgamar’s is all for de-militarization of all ‘nationalist’ movements within the country. This he feels, would force the ‘Repressive state apparatus’ to take a back seat, and usher in the possibilities of contestations within the ‘Ideological state apparatus’.

To bring in an Althussarian distinction in the context of nationalist struggles is really strange. Nationalist struggles are struggles ‘against’ the state and are not concerned about Althussarian distinctions because such distinctions apply to people who at least agree to contests ‘within’ the idea of a state whereas nationalist struggles are struggles of identity, freedom and contested histories. These issues lie beyond the Althussarian concern. In fact, for nationalist struggles, there is no distinction between the ‘ideological’ and the ‘repressive’. We have come a long way from Althussar’s theory and know how power works more insidiously than Althussar’s neat (however nuanced) distinction. No wonder people find Agamben’s “state of exception” more credible for understanding anti-state movements and the state’s repressive AS WELL AS ideological mechanism against them. In other words, Kadirmar should do well to fuse the Althussarian distinction rather than hold them apart.

I understand Kadirgamar’s concern for the subjugation of dissenting voices within the national movements which have become heavily militarized (and therefore masculinized). But those “marginalized by the politics of war” cannot be taken as a single category of people from all sides. This is to again fuzz the central issue of contesting communities and the hegemonic, majority community which holds power. It would have been far more illuminating to know what ‘produces’ militarization than what militarization becomes, because we all know about that pathology which comes to afflict the frustrations of all anti-state movements. But the ‘production’ of such pathologies can only be understood through the working of the state apparatus.

Kadigamar’s approach is quite humanistic. Having delineated many groups for us, I wonder what group he would himself identify to be a spokesperson of. Perhaps it is safest to imagine from his current status, that Kadirgamar would like to belong to a group of democratic (dissenting) activists. In that case I would like to know how he looks at the relationship between nationalism and democracy in a context where the idea of the state is being heavily contested. My reading is that in such cases, issues like democracy are part of the ideological rhetoric of the state. The moment a state is in question, democracy is also in question – a question it has to answer for itself before raising fingers on the lack of democracy in the working of its subject-population. We have to address the nature of the pathologies created by the state to critically understand problems of militarization of anti-state movements. And let us simply not do this by bringing in only the most handy humanitarian virtues to support our angst.

I obviously understand the constant necessity to ’simultaneously’ address the problems within one’s own nationalism vis-a-vis the struggle against the state. But we also know how anti-state (nationalistic) movements of our times face far more difficulties than the earlier anti-colonial movements because the machinations of the state under “democracy” is far more complex. Also, it is far more difficult to fight the ‘colonizer’ within. If the LTTE has become right-wing, its mindset certainly has to be marginalized. But the ‘dissenting’ voices shouldn’t equally get trapped in the power discourse of the state and shouldn’t get into an easy rhetoric of maintaining ‘universal’ norms in ‘marginal’ conditions.

Hmm, will stick to the arguments. I was a bit uncomfortable on my response later. There is at least a formalistic, ideological difference between someone like Kadirgamar and say a nuisance like Sumit Srivastava and they need different responses. Will keep the air cool !!

I would like to clarify that I mentioned Kadirgamar’s ‘Sinhalese’ identity in the ‘nationalist’ sense and not his own. He takes a kind of easy, elitist ground vis-a-vis the problem of the Tamilians in Sri Lanka and sides with power. As a “dissenting Tamil activist”, Kadirgamar cannot use his exasperations to get him closer to the rhetoric of the State. There may be problems with the current workings of the LTTE but it shouldn’t be forgotten that was formed after many compromises were made by other Tamil groups who played into the hands of the Sinhalese.

Kadirgamar sounds like a Government sponsored intellectual, teaching in a U.S University, who doesn’t mind being used as a two-minutes spokesperson in a news programme where Amy Goodman asks him a couple of questions only American liberals are shamelessly capable of –
What is the problem in your country? What should be done about it? And last but the most important question of all – How can the US play a role?

To these propaganda questions, Mr. Kairgamar answers with every desire to play the perfect stooge. He replies in a manner which anyone who wants to skirt a direct critique of the state would do – he talks about “progress in the political process”, to sound fair, desires the government to come out with a “fair solution” for all minorities, and – o’ how unpredictably (pun intended) – desires a “principled engagement” by the US. He satisfies everything according to the demands of his Sinhalese identity and the Sri Lankan State’s need for the US.

I have a deep suspicion of proposal-minded political jargons, where the issues become less important than the neatly drawn ways of overcoming them. It all sounds nice – and hollow. I also have scant regard for such intellectual posing in the guise of engagement. Just because the LTTE cannot quote Mrax and Gramsci, doesn’t make their claims less credible than Kadirgamar’s. But not that Kadirgamar is talented. All he can do is talk about “minorities”, “masses”, “civilians” and even the “bourgeois” whenever the particular term is handy for him, as categories in his shifty framework. He attacks militarization without going into the real reasons behind who’s responsible for it and how. This perfectly fits his state-centric, human-rights approach. He calls his own approach “part existential and part theoretical”. I guess as existential he means the angsts of being the nephew of the Foreign Minister who was murdered by the LTTE, and as theoretical he probably means the the Sri Lankan State’s annihilation of the LTTE. Kadirgamar can then have his revenge as well as his idea of a ‘Sinhalese’ democracy in place.

And please don’t miss the point of how Kadirgamar betrays his whole-hearted expectations from the Sri Lankan government to deliver all his “ethical” wishes – why? why?

This is merely an exercise to draw our attention away from the utterly barbaric way in which the Sri Lankan government has been behaving with the Tamils in particular. No one wants a war. But no one also wants people like Kadirgamar to spread one-sided stories about the war. Such a dishonest missionary zeal should end.